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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA")I to ensure the
confidentiality, accuracy, and currency
of consumer credit information.2 Its
authors could not have imagined that in
the twenty-three years since its passage, technological advances would have
enabled consumer reporting agencies
to store, disseminate, and manipulate
personal and financial data on millions
of consumers.' When the FCRA was
passed, the largest credit bureau had 27
million consumer files on computer
tape.' Today, each of the three largest
bureaus has between 170 and 190 million consumer files.' When Congress
considered the FCRA, American consumers owed about $105 billion. 6 In
1992, consumer debt exceeded $700
billion. 7 In 1970, the state of computer
technology merely suggested the development of a nationwide data bank
on consumers.' Today, that possibility
has been realized. The law has failed to
keep pace with this technological explosion and no longer meets the authors' stated objectives.
The credit reporting industry in this
country is a multi-billion dollar industry that involves the sale and use of
personal and financial data on millions
of Americans. Consumer reports 9 are
routinely used to make decisions about
whether to offer a job or lease an
apartment, whether to extend a mortgage or issue a credit card, or whether
to underwrite insurance or provide a
checking account. 0 Where the ability
of an individual to obtain a job, a
mortgage, or insurance can turn on the
contents of his or her consumer report,
it is essential that consumer reports be
reasonably free of errors, that consumer reporting agencies be responsive
to consumer complaints aboutmistakes,

It isessential that consumer
reports be reasonably free of
errors, that consumer reporting
agencies be responsive to
consumer complaints about
mistakes, and that consumers
have some control over the use of
their confidential information.
and that consumers have some control
over the use of their confidential information. This article will show why the
FCRA meets none of these objectives.
First, the article will give a background of the FCRA and a description
of the evolution of the credit reporting
industry since the law's enactment. It
will then describe industry problems
facing consumers and review how state
and federal law enforcement agencies,
as well as state legislatures and the 102d
Congress have responded to abuses of
the industry. Finally, the article will
propose legislative reforms to enable
the FCRA to meet its original objectives.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History
Congress enacted the FCRA in response to growing public concern about
the rights of consumers and the expanding use of credit in society. During the late 1960s Congress considered
a broad range of consumer protection
legislation that sought to protect consumers from abuses related to consumer credit transactions." For example, the Truth in Lending Act established uniform disclosures of consumer credit terms and provided for
private enforcement of the Act. The
protection of privacy was also a major
concern. The expanding use of com-
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puters to collect and disseminate vast
amounts of sensitive personal and financial information disturbed many
Americans who felt this technology
violated their right to privacy. 3
Much of the information collected
related to consumer credit transactions.
The consumer credit industry experienced phenomenal growth after World
War II. During this time, consumer
debt grew almost twenty-fold. 1" The
credit reporting industry grew in proportion to the increased use of credit. 5
Creditors more frequently turned to
credit bureaus for information regarding the credit histories of consumers.
Automated companies operating on a
national scale replaced the small independent credit bureaus that once kept
records on consumers and manually
communicated the information to local
merchants. These financial and technological trends hinted at the development of a nationwide data bank which
would contain information on every
citizen. 16
With the growth in size and scope of
the credit reporting industry came an
increase in the number of complaints
regarding industry practices and the
problems associated with them.' 7 Apart
from the vast amount of sensitive information stored in credit bureau files,
consumers complained about the accuracy of credit reports and the confidentiality of the reports.' 8 Consumers
further complained of the inability to
examine their own reports which prevented them from correcting any errors
or even knowing whether their own
reports contained any damaging information.' 9
In 1968, Congress responded by
considering legislation designed to address the problems in the credit reporting industry. Congresswoman Leonor
Sullivan and Senator William Proxmire
generally receive credit for sponsoring
the first comprehensive credit reporting legislation. The bill Senator
Proxmire introduced eventually became
law. 20 The Proxmire bill attempted to
address three basic problems: first, the
problem of inaccurate or misleading
82

Congressional reformers believed
that the most serious problem in
the credit reporting industry was
the existence of inaccurate and
misleading information in
consumer credit files.

information contained in consumer
credit files; second, the problem of
irrelevant or outdated information; and
third, the problem of maintaining confidentiality of consumer credit information.2' While many of the bill's
proposed solutions to these problems
later changed, the central thrust of the
FCRA revolves around these basic issues.
B. MajorProvisions
1. Accuracy of Reports
Congressional reformers believed
that the most serious problem in the
credit reporting industry was the existence of inaccurate and misleading information in consumer credit files.22
While no definitive studies indicated
the level of accuracy in credit files,
many believed that the large volume of
information collected by credit bureaus and the inherent changes in consumer credit histories produced an unacceptable rate of errors in consumer
credit reports.23 The FCRA addresses
this problem in a number of ways. It
requires credit bureaus to establish "reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy."'24 Consumers
are guaranteed access to their credit
files 25 and provided the opportunity to
correct inaccurate or incomplete information in those files.26 Finally, whenever a consumer is rejected for an
extension of credit, employment, or
insurance, the consumer must be in-
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Many in Congress felt it was unfair

to base credit decisions on minor
delinquencies that occurred in the
distant past or on extraneous
and inappropriate personal
information.

formed of the name and address of the
credit bureau that furnished the credit
report used in making the decision.27
2. Relevancy of Reports
While Congress supported the right
of creditors to know how a consumer
handled past credit obligations, legislators did not believe that outdated or
irrelevant information should determine a consumer's creditworthiness. 28
Many in Congress felt it was unfair to
base credit decisions on minor delinquencies that occurred in the distant
past 29 or on extraneous and inappropriate personal information.30 Investigative consumer reports, which include
"information on a consumer's character, general reputation, personal characteristics or mode of living ...obtained through personal interviews with
the consumer's neighbors, friends or
associates"'" were criticized for including information that was only marginally related to creditworthiness.3 2 The
FCRA addresses the problem of irrelevant and outdated information by prohibiting the reporting of adverse information older than seven years or bankruptcies older than ten years.33 The
FCRA also requires those who order
investigative consumer reports to inform the consumer who is the subject
of the report within three days of the
report order date.'
3. Confidentiality of Reports
The right to privacy and confidentiality of consumer credit information
was also a major issue.35 Because many
credit bureaus had virtually no policies
regarding to whom they could furnish
information, almost anyone could obtain a consumer credit report.36 Credit
bureaus collected information for one
purpose and often furnished it to creditors for a different purpose, without the
consumer's knowledge or consent.3 In
addition, many credit bureaus did not
have internal security procedures to
ensure the confidentiality of the information they collected.3" Finally, there
was concern over the dissemination of
credit reports to government agencies.39
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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While some consumer reporting agencies furnished reports to government
agencies pursuant only to a legal process, other agencies made the information readily available to government
agencies.'
This raised serious concerns about the willingness of consumer reporting agencies to protect
consumer's sensitive financial information.
The FCRA addresses the problems
related to privacy and confidentiality
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Because manycreditbureaus had

virtually no policies regarding to
whom they could furnish
information, almost anyone could
obtain a consumer credit report.

in a number of ways. Credit bureaus
must maintain procedures to ensure the
confidentiality of the information in
their files."' Unless the consumer consents in writing, credit bureaus are
prohibited from furnishing the
consumer's credit report to anyone
without a legitimate business need or to
anyone who does not intend to use the
information in connection with the
extension of credit, insurance, or employment." Lastly, the FCRA protects
the confidentiality of consumer reports
by providing criminal penalties for
obtaining information on a consumer
from a credit bureau under false pretenses. 3 In addition, employees or
officers of a consumer reporting agency
who disclose such information to a
person who is unauthorized to receive
the information are subject to these
criminal penalties.'
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Need For Reform
The purpose of the FCRA was to
ensure that the nation's credit reporting
system functioned fairly, accurately,
and without undue intrusion into the
privacy rights of consumers. 5 The
FCRA sought to achieve a balance
Volume 5 Number 3 / Spring 1993

between the legitimate business need of
creditors to obtain the necessary information on which to base credit decisions and the right of consumers to
protect the accuracy and confidentiality of their personal and financial
records.' The success of the FCRA in
achieving these goals is the subject of
growing debate. This article argues
that the law fails to fulfill the objectives advocated by its authors. Advances in technology and the volume of
consumer credit transactions have rendered the FCRA dangerously illequipped to meet the needs of today's
consumers.
In determining the success of the
FCRA, one must assess its effectiveness in ensuring the accuracy, confidentiality, and relevancy of the information contained in consumer reports.
The findings of recent Congressional
hearings, 7 independent studies," and
federal and state enforcement agency
experiences 9 with the credit reporting
industry cast serious doubt on the effectiveness of the law in achieving
these basic goals. Under current law,
information about consumers' lives is
too easily accessible. Sensitive personal and financial information on consumers is collected and disseminated
with little or no regard for consumers'
right to privacy. Errors riddle consumer reports that are difficult to correct.
1. Accuracy of Reports
As stated previously, the authors of
the FCRA believed that the lack of
accuracy was the most serious problem
plaguing the credit reporting industry.
Today, this same problem appears to be
the single greatest failure of the FCRA.
Recent congressional oversight hearings on the effectiveness of the FCRA
revealed that consumer report errors
were a growing problem. 0 The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") testified that complaints about errors in
consumer reports were a major source
of all consumer inquiries made to the
FTC." In 1991, more than 10,000
consumers complained to the FTC about

the inaccuracy of consumer reports.52
Last year, almost 1,400 taxpayers in
Norwich, Vermont were erroneously
recorded delinquent in their taxes because of an error by TRW, one of the
nation's three largest credit bureaus. 3
The residents of south Middlesex
County, Massachusetts suffered the
same nightmarish fate a few months
later. 4
A number of recent independent
studies also have uncovered problems
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Advances in technology and the
volume of consumer credit
transactions have rendered the
FCRA dangerously ill-equipped
to meet the needs of today's
consumers.

with the accuracy of consumer reports.
A study conducted in 1989 by James
Williams surveyed 1,500 consumer
reports and found a serious error rate of
43 percent.55 A more recent 1991
study conducted by Consumers Union
surveyed 161 consumer reports and
found that 48 percent of all reports
contained errors, while 19 percent contained serious errors that could hinder
a consumer's credit eligibility. 6 Both
studies defined serious errors to mean
those that could, or did, cause the
denial of credit, employment, or insurance.
The difficulty involved in correcting inaccurate or incomplete information contained in a consumer's file
compounds the problem of inaccurate
consumer reports. Anotherrecent study
by U.S. Public Interest Research Group
("PIRG") revealed that the average
duration of a complaint against a consumer reporting agency was 22.5 weeks,
or almost 6 months.57 The 1991 study
surveyed 155 consumer report complaints on file at the FTC. The study
further concluded that 79 percent of the
complaints against consumer reporting
agencies alleged the denial of credit
was due to errors in consumer reports."
Clearly, the rate of errors contained in
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consumer reports is unacceptably high
and the consumer's ability to promptly
correct those errors is almost nonexistent.
These high rates of errors and consumer frustration with the credit bureaus' unresponsiveness to their complaints has led to the growth of an
industry that offers quick fixes. Unfortunately, this industry often accomplishes these remedies through the use
of unscrupulous methods. The credit
repair business involves the marketing
of credit repair services to consumers
whose reports contain adverse information that interferes with the
consumer's ability to obtain credit.
These entities often promise or imply
that they can have damaging credit
information removed from the
consumer's file, even though the information may be accurate and current,59
and thus the FCRA does not require its
removal.' Often, credit repair organizations either cannot deliver on their
promises for which they have collected
hefty fees, or they do deliver, but often
by employing questionable methods.61
Where credit repair services succeed in
removing accurate and current adverse
information, this may deprive creditors of information that could be essential in making credit determinations.
The practices of these companies injure
the general public and cheat individual
consumers 62
2. Relevancy of Reports
Another problem that the authors of
the FCRA sought to remedy was the
collection and maintenance of irrelevant or outdated information in a
consumer's file. While consumer complaints about the appearance of outdated information continue to plague
the credit reporting industry, a more
serious problem appears to be the collection of irrelevant information by
consumer reporting agencies. Equifax,
one of three national consumer reporting agencies, recently entered into an
agreement with the New York State
Attorney General's office to discontinue certain of its procedures for com84

piling investigative consumer reports.63
Those procedures had resulted in the
collection of highly questionable information on thousands of consumers
in New York.
Last year, Equifax furnished at least
3,300 investigative reports on New
York residents. 64 In compiling these
reports, Equifax solicited information
aboutjob applicants that included questions regarding possible psychological
problems or disabilities, physical prob-
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Sensitive personaland financial

informationon consumers is
collected and disseminated with
little or no regard for consumers'
right to privacy.

lems or disabilities, use of drugs, excessive use of alcohol, arrests, and
activity in community service organizations. 65 According to New York
State Attorney General Robert Abrams,
these inquiries, with the exception of
those pertaining to pending criminal
cases, may have aided Equifax's employer-clients in violating New York
66
State anti-discrimination laws.
Equifax has agreed to change its questionnaire on a national basis and to
furnish to individuals, upon request,
complete copies of their investigative
reports and the interview worksheet
used in compiling them. 67
3. Confidentiality of Reports
The issues of privacy and confidentiality of consumer reports were also
significant concerns of the FCRA's
authors. With the continued evolution
of technology and the capability of the
credit reporting industry to retrieve,
manipulate, and disseminate vast
amounts of data on virtually every
aspect of an individual's life, these
concerns have only grown. 61 Moreover, the provision in the FCRA that
permits anyone with "a legitimate business need" to obtain a consumer report' has proven to be a broad loophole

through which sensitive personal and
financial information is released for
questionable purposes. This loophole
allows rental agents, check guarantee
companies, automobile salesmen, and
even dating services to legitimately
obtain consumer reports.
Unfortunately, it is sometimes just
as easy to obtain consumer reports for
fraudulent purposes. The City of New
York's Department of Consumer Affairs recently revealed that 35 percent
of the consumer reporting agencies
listed in New York City telephone
books were willing to sell consumer
reports without adhering to the security
procedures required by either the federal or state FCRA.70 The investigation
found that six of the seventeen credit
bureaus advertising in the city were
willing to provide credit reports without verifying the identity of the user of
the report or the purposes for which the
information would be used.7
Advances in computer technology
have led to other privacy abuses. For
example, credit bureaus often retrieve
information from public records, census data, payment records, automobile
registrations, and purchases made by
an individual. The information is then
processed and segmented based on specific criteria and sold to merchants and
others for direct marketing purposes
without the consumer's knowledge or
consent. It is obvious, then, that the
fears expressed by the authors of the
FCRA regarding the automation of the
credit reporting industry have been
realized.
B. Efforts to Reform
1. State Efforts
The failure of the FCRA to achieve
its intended purposes to ensure the
accuracy, relevancy, and confidentiality of consumer reports has never been
more apparent. Widespread public
support for reform of the law continues
to grow with each new revelation of
abuse involving the credit reporting
industry.72 The response to this clamor
for reform has come from both state
and federal governments. A number of
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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states have considered legislation to
enact new state laws regulating credit
reporting or to strengthen existing state
statutes in this area.73 California, Maryland, and Vermont recently enacted
legislation to protect their residents
74
from credit reporting abuses.
Also, state law enforcement agencies have taken significant actions to
curb credit reporting abuses. Twenty
Attorneys General reached a consent
agreement with TRW, one of the largest consumer reporting agencies, to end
numerous inaccuracies and abuses resulting from TRW's systems and procedures.7 The FTC worked closely
with the states in this multistate ac76
tion.
2. Federal Administrative
Efforts
The FTC also recently resolved a
number of independent enforcement
actions. One notable action the FTC
settled involved the failure of four
companies to notify applicants that they
were denied employment based on in77
formation in their consumer reports.
The four companies, McDonnell Douglas, Macy's, Kobacker, and Keystone
Corporation also failed to inform these
applicants of the name and address of
the credit bureau that supplied the reports. The failure to notify the applicants of the use and origin of the credit
78
reports violated the FCRA.
Another significant FTC enforcement action involved a relatively new
area of credit reporting abuse. The
emergence of "information brokers" or
"superbureaus ''79 has resulted in a number of questionable, if not fraudulent,
credit reporting practices. Aided by
advances in the electronic transmission
of information, these superbureaus principally function as middlemen in the
transmission of consumer reports.
Superbureaus purchase large volumes
of credit and other information about
individual consumers at discounted rates
and then resell the data. The problem
that has arisen along with the emergence of this new industry is a glaring
lack of safeguards to ensure the confiVolume 5 Number 3 / Spring 1993

dentiality of a consumer's report.
In its recent investigation of three
superbureaus, the FTC found that they
failed to adequately ensure that their
customers had a legally-permissible
purpose for obtaining consumer reports. s° The proposed settlement agreements reached by the FTC with I.R.S.C.,
CDB Infotek and Inter-Fact Inc. mandate specific steps the firms would be
required to take, including periodic
audits of "mixed-use customers." These
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Consumerreporting agencies
routinely sell information from
consumer files to direct marketers
and creditors for the purpose of
identifying individuals for
solicitations.

customers include attorneys, private
investigators, or others who might have
both legally-permissible and illegal
purposes for obtaining consumer reports.8
3. Congressional Action
Congress has also responded to the
growing clamor for reform of the
FCRA. During the past two years,
almost a dozen bills have been introduced to update and reform the FCRA.2
The House Banking Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs and Coinage has held
four oversight hearings on the FCRA. s3
The Senate Banking Subcommittee on
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs also
conducted a hearing on this issue last
year.' The most significant federal
legislative activity related to the FCRA
occurred during the 102d Congress.
Under the leadership of Congressman Esteban E. Torres, legislation
(H.R. 3596) to update and reform the
FCRA received the most extensive consideration since 1969. As Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and Coinage, Torres conducted
hearings to determine the effectiveness
of the FCRA. 5 The hearings also
served to provide Congress with possible solutions to the many alleged

problems in the credit reporting industry.
H.R. 3596 was designedto strengthen
the FCRA so that the Act would once
again achieve the original purposes
intended by its authors. Like the original authors of the FCRA, Torres sought
to ensure the accuracy, relevancy, and
confidentiality of consumer reports.
Unfortunately, the bill died on the
House floor in the final hours of the
102d Congress. A number of bills are
now pending in the 103rd Congress to
86
update and reform the FCRA.
IV.PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE
REFORM
Congress has many options available to modify the FCRA to better
achieve its initial goals, as well as to
provide greater access to consumers to
their reports.
A. Confidentiality of Consumer
Information
Congress should amend the FCRA
to ensure that a consumer reporting
agency may provide consumer reports
only in those instances in which a
consumer is seeking a benefit or the
consumer consents to the use of the
report.
1. Use of Consumer Reports for
Direct Marketing and
Prescreening
Consumer reporting agencies routinely sell information from consumer
files to direct marketers and creditors
for the purpose of identifying individuals for solicitations. I "Junk mail"
lists are often generated by consumer
reporting agencies in response to marketers' requests for consumers with
particular demographic characteristics
or purchasing patterns. Consumer reporting agencies also routinely perform prescreening for credit grantors.
Prescreening entails the selection of
creditworthy individuals who may be
eligible to receive an offer of credit
from the credit grantor.88 The selling
of information from consumers' files
for these purposes is done without the
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consumer's knowledge or consent.
Consumer report agencies should be
banned from selling target mailing lists
based on consumer information. The
FTC has recently taken action challenging the legality of this practice.89
Equifax recently terminated its target
marketing business, citing consumers'
concerns about the confidentiality and
privacy of their personal information.'
The consumer does not derive sufficient benefits from the receipt of junk
mail to outweigh the invasion of his or
her privacy.
On the other hand, prescreening
which results in offers of credit to
select individuals, does afford the consumer
certain
opportunities.
Prescreening should be a permitted
practice under the FCRA, but only
when conducted within certain parameters. First and foremost, the consumer
must be given the option to remove his
or her name from prescreened lists.
Each consumer reporting agency that
sells consumer information for
prescreened credit solicitations should
establish a system through which a
consumer can easily "opt-out" of
prescreening. Additionally, the consumer should be informed by creditors
in each prescreened solicitation about
the manner in which the consumer was
preselected for the offer and about the
consumer's option to remove his or her
name from future consideration for
such solicitations. When prescreening
is employed, the creditor must honor
the offer of credit to the consumer
provided the consumer continues to
meet the original selection criteria at
the time the consumer responds to the
offer.9
2. Use of Consumer Reports for
Employment
Under current law, consumer reports can be used for evaluating a
consumer for employment, promotion,
reassignment or retention as an employee. 92 The prospective or existing
employee has no legal right to know
that his or her consumer report has been
obtained for these purposes, and in
86

fact, a consumer reporting agency may
even furnish reports for employment
purposes over the specific objections of
a consumer.93 With the great number
of serious errors in consumer reports
that can potentially jeopardize employment opportunities the consumer
should: 1) be informed that consumer
reports may be obtained for employment purposes; 2) specifically consent
to the use of the reports for these
purposes; and 3) be given an opportunity to review and respond to harmful
information in the report when the
employer is considering denying an
employment opportunity on the basis
of such information.
3. Limits on "Legitimate
Business Need"
A consumer reporting agency may
furnish a consumer report only under
certain specific circumstances.9 4 For
the most part, 95 the report may be furnished only in those instances in which
the consumer has consented or has
initiated a transaction, such as seeking
credit, insurance, employment, or certain government benefits. The FCRA
also permits a consumer reporting
agency to furnish a consumer report to
a person who has a legitimate business
need for the information in connection
with a business transaction involving
the consumer. 96 Because of the abuses
in this area, it is important to limit the
furnishing of reports to those instances
in which the consumer actually initiated the transaction. For instance, a car
dealer should not be able to obtain a
customer's credit report simply because the customer walked into the
dealership. Rather, the customer would
actually have to apply for car financing, or enter into a contract to purchase
a car, before the dealer could obtain the
customer's consumer report.
4. Limits on Resellers of
Information
The FCRA does not specifically
address superbureaus, i.e., entities in
the business of reselling consumer reports. While superbureaus are by defi-

nition consumer reporting agencies and
thus subject to the parameters of the
FCRA, they do pose additional concerns that should be expressly addressed
by the Act. In particular, FCRA should
require resellers to disclose to the consumer reporting agency the identity of
the ultimate end-user of the report and
each permissible purpose for which the
report is furnished to the end-user. A
reseller should have in place procedures to ensure that the reports are sold
only for permissible purposes under
the FCRA and only to those authorized
to receive such reports.
B. Accuracy of Information
Modifying the process whereby consumer reporting agencies investigate
information disputed by consumers
(reinvestigation) is especially important if the FCRA is to meet the objectives of ensuring accurate and current
consumer information. As stated earlier, the unacceptably high rates of
errors and unresponsiveness of the credit
bureaus to consumer complaints about
mistakes demand reform.
1. Imposing Affirmative Duties
on Furnishers of Information
A major source of errors in consumer reports is the furnishers of information for those reports.9 7 Under current law, individuals and entities that
provide consumer information to consumer reporting agencies have no duty
to provide reliable information, to investigate disputed information properly, or to ensure that information they
determine to be erroneous is not repeatedly submitted to consumer reporting agencies.
To staunch the flow of inaccurate
information, it is important that a modified FCRA impose duties upon furnishers of information. Those should
include: 1) an obligation not to provide
any information that the person has
reason to believe is incomplete or inaccurate; 2) a requirement to establish
reasonable procedures to ensure the
accuracy of information transmitted to
consumer reporting agencies; 3) a duty
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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to correct and update information; and
4) a duty to investigate promptly any
disputed information.
2. Reinvestigation of Disputed
Information
With respect to correcting errors in
consumer reports, new reinvestigation
procedures must be established to reduce the delays in deleting inaccurate
or incomplete information. The FCRA
now requires only that reinvestigations
be conducted within a reasonable period of time.9" The law should require
that consumer reporting agencies complete reinvestigations within thirty days
of receiving notice of the dispute from
the consumer and promptly delete inaccurate or incomplete information
from a consumer's file. Further, the
law should mandate that appropriate
procedures be in place to prevent the
reappearance of deleted information.
The FCRA should require that the
consumer reporting agency promptly
inform the consumer about the results
of the reinvestigation, including providing the consumer, free of charge, a
revised consumer report when
changes have been made to the
consumer's file. This latter requirement would help the consumer better
understand the changes made in his or
her file.
C. Access to Consumer Reports
1. Charges for Consumer
Reports
The FCRA requires only that charges
for consumers to obtain copies of their
reports be "reasonable." 99 Many consumers do not obtain copies of their
reports and, therefore, cannot effectively police the contents for errors.
Consumers should be encouraged to
monitor their reports for inaccurate
and incomplete information regularly.
There is probably no more effective
way to ensure the accuracy of reports
than to give the consumer unfettered
access to his or her report. One way to
do this is to require that consumer
reporting agencies furnish consumers
with an annual free copy of their report
Volume 5 Number 3 /Spring 1993

upon request.
TRW recently announced that it
would implement such a policy of free
annual reports." Additionally, some
states, like Vermont and Maryland,''
provide reports free of charge while
other states, such as Maine,' limit the
costs of reports. There is a general
sentiment in these states, expressed by
some members of Congress, that information in consumer reports belongs to
the consumer. 3 Further, the need for
the consumer to have access to this
information greatly outweighs the costs
to the consumer reporting agencies of
furnishing reports free of charge. 14
2. Adverse Action
Congress should modify the FCRA
to encourage users of consumer reports
to share those reports whenever they
contemplate taking adverse action because of information in the reports.
Furnishing such access to consumers
may alleviate the denial of important
benefits to consumers caused by errors
in the consumer report. Particularly in
the area of employment, where the
consumer has so much at stake, the law
should require that prior to denying an
employment opportunity based on a
consumer report, the employer must
provide the consumer with a copy of
the report and a reasonable chance to
respond to adverse information in the
report.
3. Standardization of Reports
Consumer reports are often difficult
to decipher. Each of the three major
reporting agencies produces a different
product, with varying degrees of readability. The FCRA should require the
FTC to prescribe the form in which
consumer reporting agencies make disclosures to maximize the comprehensibility and standardization of reports.
This would not entail the FTC's devising one standardized format for disclosures, but would require the FTC to
prescribe a model format which agencies could use as a basis for developing
a simplified disclosure.
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4. Increased Disclosures
Consumers should have access to
everything consumer reporting agencies maintain in the consumer's file. 0 5
Additionally, consumer reporting agencies should provide consumers with
information fully identifying all persons who accessed their files, including
for what purpose the accessor used the
information. The FCRA only requires
that consumer reporting agencies to
ensure that consumer reports are obtained for a permissible purpose, but
does not require the agency to reveal
that purpose to the consumer whose
report was accessed."°
Often, regular customers of a consumer reporting agency will provide a
blanket certification to the agency identifying the permissible purposes under
the FCRA for which they intend to
obtain consumer reports. °7 Consequently, the consumer reporting agency
cannot identify the permissible purpose for which the entity obtained any
particular report. Blanket certification
cannot safeguard adequately against
abuses of the credit reporting system
given the greater and instant access to
consumer reports through computers.
Therefore, the consumer reporting
agency should be responsible for ascertaining the permissible purpose each
time a report is accessed, electronically
or otherwise, and for reporting that
purpose to the consumer whose file was
involved.
D. Credit Repair Organizations
Any reform of the credit reporting
industry should include strictures on
credit repair businesses that often operate through scams. The industry frequently preys on individuals, many of
whom have low incomes, are desperate
to clean up their credit records or have
simply grown frustrated with the unresponsiveness of credit bureaus to complaints about mistakes. The FCRA
should regulate this industry to ensure
that consumers are provided with necessary information about credit repair
organizations to make informed decisions regarding the purchase of their
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services, and to protect the public from
unfair and deceptive advertising and
business practices.
While disclosures are important to
inform the consumer and should be
mandated, 0 8 one of the most effective
ways to police this industry would be to
prohibit payment in advance of the
time that the organization fully performs the services. Tennessee and New
York have implemented such legislation and have been very successful in
cracking down on illegitimate credit
repair businesses.
V. CONCLUSION
Over two decades ago, Congress
enacted the FCRA to regulate a growing industry that revolved around the
collection and dissemination of personal and financial data on millions of
American consumers. Congress acted
in response to public concern about the
loss of privacy regarding sensitive consumer information and the inaccuracy
of that information which formed the
basis for such critical decisions as
whether to extend a mortgage or offer
someone ajob. While the FCRA's goal
was to enhance the accuracy, relevancy,
and confidentiality of consumer reports, the FCRA no longer meets these
objectives.
Public confidence in the consumer
reporting industry is no greater today
than it was in 1970. The tremendous
ease with which computers allow for
the collection, storage, manipulation,
and dissemination of data has generated a new outcry for reform of the
industry. The original objectives of the
FCRA are still apt today, but legislative
reforms are necessary to accomplish
those goals. .5
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Consumers Can Now
CompareAlcoholic
Content of Beer
Ending a practice in effect since
Prohibition, a major beer brewer will
start listing the alcoholic content of its
beer on cans and labels, and other
brewers are expected to follow soon.
Up until recently, beer companies were
prohibited from disclosing alcoholic
content on the label or can, but after
Adolph Coors Co. won a challenge to
the law on constitutional grounds, the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms is revising its regulations. Consumers will be able to compare alcoholic content of beer the same way they
now compare calories. The following
is the alcoholic content by volume of
the major brands: Budweiser, 5 percent; Miller High Life, Natural Lite,
Miller Genuine Draft, Busch, 4.7 percent; Old Milwaukee, 4.5 percent; Coors
Light, 4.4 percent; Milwaukee's Best,
4.3 percent; Bud Light and Miller Lite,
4.2 percent.

Ozone Scofflaws
The Federal Government is offering up to a $10,000 reward for
information about people who release into the air ozone-depleting
substances, such as the hydro-chlorofluorocarbons used in air-conditioners. Homeowners may be tipped
off if an air-conditioning repairman shows up without vacuum recovery equipment or charges for
new refrigerant instead of recycling the old. However, homeowners
may have trouble recouping the
$10,000 award. To receive the
money, the government must gain a
conviction against the alleged violator and collect damages. The Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") then has the discretion as
to when and how much money to
award. To date, no awards have
been given, although the agency
has received approximately 500 tips.
To report a possible violation, call the
EPA's Stratospheric Ozone Information Hotline at (800) 296-1996.

Studies Question the
Effectiveness of
Mammograms for Women
Under50
The debate over whether
mammograms can help detect breast
cancer in women under fifty is one
of the most controversial topics in
medicine today. New data shows
that women in their forties who had
mammograms had the same death
rate from breast cancer as those
who did not have the procedure.
Previously, women in their forties
had been told that mammograms,
which cost $50 to $150, could save
their lives. In light of the new studies, most doctors and scientists are
recommending that women wait
until age fifty to have a
mammogram. However, almost all
experts agree that a mammogram is
an effective tool in detecting breast
cancer in older women.

